



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power

FOCUS EUROPE

AUGUST 2025

Authors

Ruchira Kamboj
Arshiya Chaturvedi

Volume I, Issue 2



Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor, India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003

www.delhipolicygroup.org



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power

Focus Europe

Vol. I, Issue 2

August 2025

ABOUT US

Founded in 1994, the Delhi Policy Group (DPG) is among India's oldest think tanks with its primary focus on strategic and international issues of critical national interest. DPG is a non-partisan institution and is independently funded by a non-profit Trust. Over past decades, DPG has established itself in both domestic and international circles and is widely recognised today among the top security think tanks of India and of Asia's major powers.

Since 2016, in keeping with India's increasing global profile, DPG has expanded its focus areas to include India's regional and global role and its policies in the Indo-Pacific. In a realist environment, DPG remains mindful of the need to align India's ambitions with matching strategies and capabilities, from diplomatic initiatives to security policy and military modernisation.

At a time of disruptive change in the global order, DPG aims to deliver research based, relevant, reliable and realist policy perspectives to an actively engaged public, both at home and abroad. DPG is deeply committed to the growth of India's national power and purpose, the security and prosperity of the people of India and India's contributions to the global public good. We remain firmly anchored within these foundational principles which have defined DPG since its inception.

Authors

Ambassador Ruchira Kamboj, Senior Fellow for International Security and Global Affairs, Delhi Policy Group

Arshiya Chaturvedi, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Delhi Policy Group as an Institution.

Cover Images:

Emblem of NATO at the NATO headquarters in Brussels with Member States's Flag in the Background. Source: [NATO](#)
Leaders from the NATO Member States at the Hague Summit on June 24-25, 2025. Source: [NATO](#)

© 2025 by the Delhi Policy Group

Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor,

India Habitat Centre,

Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003

www.delhipolicygroup.org

Focus Europe:

Beyond Two Percent: NATO Defence Spending in a Multipolar World

Contents

Executive Summary	1
The North Atlantic Framework for Shared Defence.....	1
The Case for Increased Defence Spending	2
Feasible or Not?	4
EU Steps to Strengthen Military Capacity and Spending	7
Conclusion/Way Ahead	9

Beyond Two Percent: NATO Defence Spending in a Multipolar World

by

Ambassador Ruchira Kamboj & Arshiya Chaturvedi

Executive Summary

The current geopolitical order is characterized by a global dispersion of power, prompting countries to actively boost their national capabilities and reduce external dependencies. A key focus of this pursuit is strategic autonomy in defence and security. As a result, nations worldwide are increasing defence budgets and modernizing their military inventories to strengthen national security, maintain credible deterrence, and achieve technological superiority in an increasingly volatile global landscape.

Guided by this strategic imperative, and particularly as the transatlantic alliance has come under strain, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Allies have been engaging in extensive deliberations to increase defence spending. While some efforts were made in the past, present-day geopolitical dynamics and an evolving threat landscape have evoked a renewed sense of urgency. This sense of urgency was reflected in the Joint Statement at the NATO Summit in The Hague (June 2025), where Allies pledged to raise annual defence and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.¹

The proposed increase is both ambitious and consequential – a quantum leap from the 2% pledge reaffirmed in 2014.² Its successful realisation will not be straightforward. Financial challenges in an already indebted Europe could result in uneven implementation of the target – potentially creating a two-tiered alliance – and thereby undermining NATO's core principle of collective defence.

This brief takes a detailed look into the economic, political, and strategic capacities of European allies as well as the possible challenges they may face in meeting the newly proposed target, and seeks to assess its overall feasibility.

The North Atlantic Framework for Shared Defence

NATO was established in 1949 with 12 founding members to safeguard the security and sovereignty of its member states through political and military means. Today, it

¹ NATO, Press Release, "The Hague Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2025)." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), June 25, 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_236705.htm.

² NATO. "Funding NATO." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), July 26, 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm.

has grown to include 32 countries across North America and Europe, with its headquarters now in Brussels, Belgium.³

The Organisation does not have its own standing army. Instead, member states provide resources under two categories of contribution⁴.

- **Direct Contributions** – Pooled into NATO's common budgets, these finance headquarters expense, international staff salaries, the command structure, operating costs, common infrastructure, and joint civilian-military activities such as airfields, meteorological services, navigation aids, and joint procurement. Contributions are allocated according to a cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income (GNI), ensuring fair burden-sharing.
- **National (Indirect) Contributions** – The bulk of NATO's capability, borne from each country's own defence budget. These cover national armed forces (land, air, maritime, and other deployable units), pensions for retired defence staff, stockpiling of war reserves, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, defence R&D, and military or financial aid to Allies. Forces and resources remain under national command unless assigned to NATO operations.

The Case for Increased Defence Spending

The United States is by far the largest defence spender in NATO, outspending all other member states by a substantial margin. It covers about 16% of NATO's direct/common budgets, a share it holds jointly with Germany under the GNI-based cost-sharing formula.⁵ Its indirect (national) defence expenditure, however, is unparalleled – at just under USD 1 trillion annually, it exceeds the combined defence spending of all European allies and Canada, which together amount to a little over USD 500 billion.⁶

As matters stand, this disparity in defence expenditure remains a major source of contention within the transatlantic partnership. During his first term, and now again in his second, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticised NATO Allies for not paying their 'fair share' toward the Alliance's security framework. He has often

³ NATO. "NATO Member Countries" North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), March 11, 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm

⁴ Supra Note 2

⁵ Reuben, Anthony. "How Much Do Nato Members Spend on Defence?" *BBC News*, December 3, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074>.

⁶ SIPRI. "Unprecedented Rise in Global Military Expenditure as European and Middle East Spending Surges." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 28, 2025. <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges>.

linked the US's commitment to NATO's Article 5 to whether or not a member state meets its spending obligations.⁷

In recent years there have been concerted efforts to step up European and Canadian military commitments and to rebalance burden-sharing within NATO. In 2014, after Russia's annexation of Crimea, NATO leaders pledged to move toward spending at least 2% of GDP on defence and to strengthen readiness. As of June–July 2024, 23 of 32 Allies meet the 2% benchmark.⁸

Separately, in 2019, Allies agreed a new cost-sharing formula for the common budgets (civil, military and NSIP) for 2021–2024, increasing European and Canadian shares and reducing the US share from ~22% to about 16% – roughly on par with Germany.⁹

Together, these steps were intended to promote fairer burden-sharing across the Alliance.

Since March 2025, however, events have taken a different turn. On 3 March, following a 'heated meeting' with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House, the Trump administration had temporarily suspended the delivery of US military and intelligence support to Ukraine.¹⁰ On 3 June, it had paused certain weapons deliveries to Ukraine, including air defence missiles, following a review of military spending and American support for foreign countries.¹¹

As NATO's major defence power, the United States' policy choices carry significant implications for the Alliance, raising questions about its collective military posture, overall effectiveness, and cohesion. The more so, where this concerns Ukraine, which carries direct security implications for the European member states. It was against this backdrop that NATO Heads of State and Government, at the Hague Summit in June 2025, reached unanimity on a substantial increase in defence investment, pledging at least 5% of their annual GDP over a period of the next ten years. Of the committed share, a minimum of 3.5% is to be allocated to meeting the needs of national armed forces, those of Allies, or the Alliance as a whole. The remaining 1.5% will be directed

⁷ Davis, Ian. "NATO's Direct Funding Arrangements: Who Decides and Who Pays?" Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 7, 2024. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-background/2024/natos-direct-funding-arrangements-who-decides-and-who-pays>.

⁸ NATO, Press Release. "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024)". https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf

⁹ Supra Note 7.

¹⁰ Roth, Andrew, and Oliver Holmes. "US Suspends All Military Aid to Ukraine in Wake of Trump-Zelenskyy Row." The Guardian, March 4, 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/04/us-military-aid-ukraine-pause-trump-zelenskyy-updates>.

¹¹ Holmes, Kristen, Lex Harvey, and Haley Britzky. "US Pauses Some Munitions Shipments to Ukraine, Including Air Defense Missiles, Senior White House Official Says." CNN, July 2, 2025. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/01/us/pentagon-hegseth-ukraine-munitions-hnk>.

to protecting critical infrastructure, enhancing cyber and civil resilience, fostering innovation, and strengthening the defence industrial base. NATO member states are to submit annual plans outlining a credible, incremental pathway to achieving the proposed target. Progress will be reviewed in 2029.¹²

This marked a significant recalibration of the Alliance's strategic posture, underscoring Europe's and Canada's resolve to assume greater responsibility for collective defence in a rapidly deteriorating security environment.

Feasible or Not?

The unanimity achieved in the Hague Summit Declaration marks a strong political statement of the Allies' iron-clad commitment to NATO's solidarity and collective defence. President Trump's reassertion of NATO's Article 5 on this occasion was especially noteworthy. His statement – "We're with them all the way" – removed lingering doubts about the US security guarantee, reaffirming America's central role in the Alliance.¹³

However, the outcome was far from unproblematic. There were Allies that demonstrated a reluctance to fully commit to this jointly agreed target. Spain, for instance, openly rejected the new target. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez noted that for Spain to meet NATO's core military requirements, it would only need to allocate 2.1% of its GDP to defence. Slovakia, too, 'reserved' the right to determine the pace at which its defence spending would increase and not necessarily follow the Alliance-prescribed plan.¹⁴ Similarly, the Belgian Government reportedly expressed reservations, but overall, supported the Alliance's mandate of increased defence spending as reasonable.¹⁵

These divergences in position are best understood in light of the fact that NATO member states vary significantly in their fiscal capacity, security priorities, and public sentiments – all of which are critical in shaping their commitment to defence spending. Suffice to say that the proposed target represents a substantial increase – a double and even three times increase for some member states – and demands a greater share of national output than most countries currently allocate to their military.

¹² Supra Note 1

¹³ Steff Chávez, Henry Foy, and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany. "Donald Trump with Nato 'All the Way' after Questioning Mutual Defence Pact." @FinancialTimes. Financial Times, June 25, 2025. <https://www.ft.com/content/e55f27db-3ebe-44fd-b621-228238ca04ef>.

¹⁴ AFP. "Spain Publishes Nato Letter to Back Spending Exemption Claim." The Times of India. Times of India, June 23, 2025. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/spain-publishes-nato-letter-to-back-spending-exemption-claim/articleshow/122024107.cms>.

¹⁵ Lyubov Pronina, and Andrea Palasciano. "Belgium Eyes Supporting 5% GDP Defense Spending at NATO Summit." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, June 17, 2025. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-17/belgium-eyes-supporting-5-gdp-defense-spending-at-nato-summit>.

Statistics reveal that globally only 9 countries as of 2024 spent 5% or more of their GDP on military expenses. Important to note that most of these countries were in active war, petro-states or are quite simply, authoritarian regimes.¹⁶ Clearly, the 'task' is onerous, if not quite unrealistic.

The data underscore how difficult even the 2% benchmark has been to achieve, highlighting the scale of the challenge ahead. By 2021, only 6 NATO member states had met the target of 2 per cent or more in defence spending. Then in 2024, driven by dedicated intent and effort amid deepening global volatility, the number reached 23 of the 32 NATO countries¹⁷, with average military spending across the alliance totalling approximately US\$1.5 trillion.¹⁸ The projections indicate that for all NATO members to achieve the proposed 3.5 per cent target in 2035, their annual military spending would need to increase by about US\$ 1.4 trillion above 2024 levels. Country-specific estimates highlight the scale of required defence spending: Germany at US\$329 billion, France at US\$221 billion, and Italy at US\$158 billion.¹⁹ Such allocations of national economic output to defence entail significant trade-offs with other critical sectors – healthcare, education, and infrastructure – reflecting the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma, in which governments must balance military spending against social programs under limited resources.

So, what are the chances that Europe will get there? Without a doubt, it will be hard.

This is because Europe has traditionally leaned to social sector spending. Per 2023 data, total expenditure on social protection benefits in the EU accounted for 26.8% of GDP.²⁰ Defence spending, on the other hand, has historically represented a small share of GDP.²¹ This long-standing pattern has embedded across European societies a strong social security culture, which makes any prominent shift in the status quo a politically and socially difficult stance to sustain. France, which is among the highest spenders on social benefits within the EU, presents a notable example. Since 2017, President Emmanuel Macron has faced strong domestic criticism for attempts to reduce social

¹⁶ Tian, Dr Nan , Lorenzo Scarazzato, and Jade Guiberteau Ricard. "NATO's New Spending Target: Challenges and Risks Associated with a Political Signal." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 27, 2025. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/natos-new-spending-target-challenges-and-risks-associated-political-signal>.

¹⁷ Supra Note 8

¹⁸ Liang, Xiao , Nan Tian, Diego Lopes Da Silva, and et al. "SIPRI Fact Sheet KEY FACTS." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI), April 2025. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf.

¹⁹ Supra Note 16

²⁰ Eurostat. "Social Protection Statistics - Early Estimates - Statistics Explained." European Union (EU), November 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Social_protection_statistics_-_early_estimates.

²¹ Eurostat. "Government Expenditure on Defence." European Union (EU), March 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_expenditure_on_defence.

security contributions, widely viewed as undermining France's welfare model in order to create fiscal space for other priorities. The upcoming vote in the French National Assembly on September 8 is a vote on reducing the government budget in order to create savings, emblematic of Macron-era fiscal reform pressures.²²

Another critical challenge that exists is the efficient utilisation²³ of the additional defence funds, if the European member states do succeed in allocating these. Past studies have shown that sudden increases in military expenditure, without a well-defined plan, can result in procedural risks such as procurement inefficiencies, overpricing, misuse of funds, and circumvention of oversight mechanisms, undermining the intended benefits of higher defence expenditure.

There is concern regarding the capacity of the European defence industrial complex to absorb and effectively realise such surplus resources. If the industry cannot scale up production, manage increased demand, or deliver quality outputs efficiently, more money into the system will not result in enhanced military capability. For decades, European countries have prioritised social, economic and political considerations, leaving defence largely as a secondary concern. This prolonged neglect has resulted in Europe's defence industry base becoming fragmented, with limited economies of scale due to cost-prohibitive production and slowed technological development.²⁴ Europe also relies heavily on the US for its defence procurement, such that between 2020 and 2024, approximately 64% of defence equipment purchased by the European NATO countries came from the US²⁵, making it the EU's largest supplier.

There is also the challenge of NATO members being pressed to purchase much-needed American weapons. This follows a recent US policy decision requiring European nations to fund and supply US-made arms to Ukraine – a move framed both as ensuring continued support for Kyiv and as a way to spur higher European defence spending. While intended to promote burden-sharing within NATO, the policy risks slowing the development of an autonomous European defence industrial

²² Chrisafis, Angelique. "France Faces New Political Crisis as PM Expected to Lose Confidence Vote." *The Guardian*, August 26, 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/26/france-political-crisis-francois-bayrou-prime-minister>.

²³ Ball, Nicole, and Len Le Roux. "Managing Financial Resources", *Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook* (Centre for Democracy and Development). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2004. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu02.pdf>.

²⁴ Shirley, Wilson, and Dejana Saric. "The Future of European Defense." *Goldmansachs.com*, June 30, 2025. <https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense>; Clapp, Sebastian. "European Defence Industrial Strategy." *European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)*, September 2024. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/762402/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)762402_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/762402/EPRS_BRI(2024)762402_EN.pdf).

²⁵ SIPRI. "Ukraine the World's Biggest Arms Importer; United States' Dominance of Global Arms Exports Grows as Russian Exports Continue to Fall." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*, March 10, 2025. <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/ukraine-worlds-biggest-arms-importer-united-states-dominance-global-arms-exports-grows-russian>.

base. In the short term, resources may be diverted to meeting Ukraine's immediate needs with US equipment rather than building Europe's own long-term capabilities.

There are also other miscellaneous challenges that affect the strategic plan of increased defence spending. One such concern is associated with the economic concept of 'defence cost inflation'.²⁶ The concept propounds that costs in the defence sector typically rise faster than general inflation due to factors such as the rising cost of advanced technology, specialised labour, and complex procurement processes. This means that even with substantial increases in defence spending, the actual gains in military capability remain modest. Over time, as each Euro buys less, this could potentially result in greater wasteful spending of resources.

Further, increased defence spending under NATO's new commitment may also exacerbate member states' public debt. Many European states are already struggling with high levels of public debt. Germany, for instance, has traditionally maintained strict debt control. However, in 2025, it made policy amendments to remove the 'debt brake' to allow more money into defence spending. France's debt level is at 112 per cent of its GDP. Italy has a 135 per cent Debt to GDP ratio, and the IMF recently issued a cautionary note for urgent fiscal reforms.²⁷ These case studies underscore the fragile fiscal space across major NATO economies – any increase in defence spending may further raise borrowing costs, limit budget flexibility, and weaken governments' capacity to address future economic or security shocks, thereby intensifying long-term fiscal vulnerabilities.

EU Steps to Strengthen Military Capacity and Spending

On the question of whether the EU is serious about the new target, the default assumption remains affirmative, even if this may be challenged in execution. Poland has already taken the lead – its defence spending reached about 4.1% of GDP in 2024 and is expected to rise to 4.7% by the end of 2025.²⁸ If current trends persist, it is on track to become one of the first NATO nations to hit 5% of GDP, potentially as early as 2026.

Others, notably Core and Eastern Europeans (Baltics), are already at or above 3 percent. Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Sweden) are accelerating budget

²⁶ Wolf Katharina. "Putting numbers on capabilities: Defence inflation vs. cost escalation". European Union Institute for Security Studies, July 2015, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193003/Brief_27_Defence_inflation.pdf

²⁷ Supra Note 16

²⁸ Oleksiejuk, Michał. "NATO Review - Sharing the Burden: How Poland and Germany Are Shifting the Dial on European Defence Expenditure." NATO Review, April 14, 2025. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2025/04/14/sharing-the-burden-how-poland-and-germany-are-shifting-the-dial-on-european-defence-expenditure/index.html>.

increases. Western and Southern Europe (Belgium, Netherlands, Spain) are beginning plans to rise towards the 2-5 percent targets, albeit more gradually.

There are other encouraging signs. In March 2024, the European Commission had proposed the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS)—a forward-looking blueprint aimed at boosting the EU's defence industrial capacity through 2035. Its objectives? To foster a more unified and resilient European defence industry base by reducing market fragmentation, decreasing reliance on foreign weapons, and boosting intra-EU defence trade. EDIS dictates the EU's target of increasing the value of intra-EU defence trade to 35% with at least 50% of EU countries' defence procurement to be sourced from the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and 40% of equipment purchases to be made collaboratively. To support EDIS, the Commission introduced the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), allocating €1.5 billion for 2025–2027 to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the EU defence sector.²⁹

More recently—March 2025—the EU published its White Paper, outlining its scheme on the rearmament of Europe under the title 'Readiness 2030'. The document discussed the various financial levers towards facilitating the EU's plan to enhance its military capacities. This included the Stability and Growth Pact that allows member states to temporarily exceed budgetary limits via a "national escape clause," to be capped at 1.5% of GDP above the baseline for four years (2025–2028). It also proposed the launch of a Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a €150 billion loan facility to support defence investments, and encouraged the European Investment Bank (EIB) to expand its lending for security and defence projects. The paper further argued for mobilising private capital through the EU's Savings and Investment Union, channelling underutilised savings into productive defence investment. In June 2025, the European Council, in pursuit of its defence-boosting objectives, welcomed the adoption of the Regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and the urgent activation of national escape clauses under the Stability and Growth Pact. The Council also called for the swift approval of proposals to integrate defence investment incentives into both the EU budget and cohesion policy.³⁰

²⁹ Clapp, Sebastian. "European Defence Industrial Strategy." *European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)*, September 2024.

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/762402/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)762402_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/762402/EPRS_BRI(2024)762402_EN.pdf).

³⁰ Clapp, Sebastian, Martin Höflmayer, Elena Lazarou, and et al. "ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030." *European Parliament. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)*, April 2025. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769566/EPRS_BRI\(2025\)769566_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769566/EPRS_BRI(2025)769566_EN.pdf).

Together, these measures mark a paradigm shift — embedding defence as a collective EU economic and financial priority rather than a purely national responsibility.

Conclusion/Way Ahead

For decades, Europe has accorded low priority to defence, relying heavily on NATO's collective security framework, notably the US, as the primary security provider within the transatlantic partnership. Amid increasingly complex threat landscapes, however, the United States has pressed its Allies to assume greater responsibility for security and defence. Recognizing this vulnerability stemming from a limited ability to defend itself independently, the EU has now adopted the strategic objective of enhancing its defence capabilities, implementing a comprehensive set of strategies and policy measures to this end. The decision to go beyond two percent of defence spending is reflective of this trend.

The road ahead, however, is fraught with political, economic, and industrial challenges. The new target is highly ambitious, especially for heavily indebted European states. The trade-off is stark: higher defence spending will inevitably compete with welfare programmes, long a political priority in Europe. In this sense, the pledge can be read as both a political signal to keep President Trump committed to NATO — achieved with his “I’m with you all the way” remark — and as a recognition that Europe’s security environment has fundamentally changed.

That said, it would be premature to dismiss the commitment as unserious. Outcomes are likely to be mixed. Some states appear determined to move toward the target, while others have already opted out. Is the pledge then likely to exacerbate divisions within the Alliance- between those who will reach the target and those who will struggle? Ironically, the stakes are too high for anything less than full, committed and coordinated action by all member states.

The conflict in Ukraine is central to the issue. So long as it continues, Europe can be expected to sustain its heightened defence effort. But once the conflict subsides, cracks may re-emerge—perhaps not in NATO itself, but in the broader transatlantic relationship, where differences over priorities could resurface in other domains.



Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor,
India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road
New Delhi - 110003
India

www.delhipolicygroup.org